

G. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Department of State receives significant Federal funding in relation to its various drug interdiction, supply reduction and alternative development programs.

1. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)

	FY 2005 ¹ Requested	FY 2005 ² Final	FY 2006 ³ Requested	FY 2006 ⁴ Enacted	FY 2007 ⁵ Request
Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) Budget*	\$731	\$725.2	\$734.5	\$727.2	\$721.5
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) Budget*	\$190.6	\$178	\$341.2	\$301	\$445.2
Supplemental Account*	-	\$260	-	-	-
Total INL Budget*	\$1,089.8	\$2,833	\$1,218.4	\$1,199.6	\$1,166.7
Drug Resources Percentage	84.6%	41.1%	88.3%	85.7%	76.9%

* in millions

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The President's FY 2007 budget requests \$721.5 million for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI). This is a \$5.7 million decrease from the FY 2006 enacted amount of \$727.2 million. While the committee supports the FY 2007 budget request, we are concerned with the decline in the proposed levels of financial support for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative and the dire situation in Afghanistan. It is encouraging to see that the President's FY 2007 budget includes \$297.4 million for counterdrug support in Afghanistan.⁶ It is vital that the U.S. work with its allies to continue to stamp out drug production at the source and build and maintain momentum for these critical programs.

During a committee-initiated briefing with INL held in November 2005, it was suggested by INL staff that their counter-narcotics mission may be better supported and achieved if their budget resources were divided between counter-narcotics missions and law enforcement support missions, instead of by country program. The INL budget is currently divided into an ACI account and an International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account, which seems to inhibit the discretion of INL to designate resources to purely counterdrug missions. This type of division may provide INL with more flexibility to move money to the programs or countries that are in need of additional counterdrug resources at a specific time. Although no proposals have been made to affect this change, the committee supports research into this possible new budget

structure, on the condition that INL provide strong justification for this change.

Programs operated by INL support two of the State Department's strategic goals, which are "to reduce the entry of illegal drugs into the United States" and "to minimize the impact of international crime on the United States and its citizens."⁷

While counter-terrorism operations receive the highest priority in many of the regions of the world in which INL functions, according to documents received from INL, 85.75 percent of their FY 2006 budget has been designated for counterdrug missions.⁸ Illegal drug production and trade has long been believed to finance terrorist activities, so the committee commends INL for prioritizing counterdrug missions.

2. Andean Counterdrug Initiative

The State Department's INL Bureau and its Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) have both received "adequate" ratings in the administration's CY 2005 Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART) process.⁹ The committee supports the programs' efforts to develop long-term performance and efficiency measures.

The committee supports the administration's request for \$721.5 million for the ACI but is disappointed that it represents a \$5.7 million decrease from \$727.2 million appropriated for FY 2006. The ACI budget provides support to Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil, Venezuela and Panama.¹⁰ These funds are needed to continue programs in law enforcement, border control, crop reduction, alternative economic development, democratic institution building, and administration of justice and human rights programs in the region. It is critical to maintain the priority of funding drug control programs in Colombia, since 90 percent of the cocaine that enters the United States either originates in, or transits through, Colombia.¹¹

The committee is also concerned about funding for the Air Bridge Denial program, which provides assets to conduct surveillance and drug interdiction in Colombia. The Air Bridge Denial program was once a separate line item with separate funding and requests, in order to facilitate congressional oversight, but is now funded through the ACI.¹² The administration has proposed \$465 million for Colombia under ACI, with approximately \$13 million designated for the Air Bridge Denial program. This is a slight decrease from the \$14 million appropriated in FY 2006.¹³ Moreover, the re-request is significantly lower than the State Department FY 2006 re-request for \$21 million.¹⁴ As stated in the National Drug Control Strategy, the Air Bridge Denial program contributes to Colombia's success.¹⁵ The committee agrees with this assessment, and recommends the administration provide greater support for the program.

It is crucial that the State Department be provided with appropriate air assets and equipment, which are essential to the counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism missions in the Andean Region. In its FY 2007 budget, the administration has requested \$65.7 million for the Critical Flight Safety Program (CFSP), which is intended to upgrade aged and ailing aircraft. While this seems like a noble objective, the committee is concerned that this sum of money has been designated solely for upgrading 35 year-old helicopters, with over 10,100 airframe hours, instead of purchasing new aircraft, which will serve their mission for a longer period of time.¹⁶ For the amount of money designated to refurbish 35 year-old helicopters—with 6,000 more airframe hours than DOD customarily allows its

helicopters to remain in service¹⁷—the administration may be able to purchase nearly 20 new Huey II helicopters.

Following seven years of counterdrug work, U.S. efforts in Colombia are increasingly bearing concrete results directly impacting the domestic supply in America. The price of cocaine and heroin originating from the Andean region has risen and the purity has decreased.¹⁸ These successes are due in large part to interdiction missions carried out by the Marine Patrol Aircraft (MPA) and other air-based interdiction efforts. In order to capitalize on these gains, the committee agrees with International Relations Committee chairman, Henry Hyde, in urging the State Department to replenish and bolster MPA air assets for the Colombian Navy.¹⁹

In order to maintain the outstanding results to date under plan Colombia, both with coca and opium eradication it is essential that the 22 aircraft (fixed and rotor) lost by the Colombian National Police (CNP) since 2000 be promptly replaced. In addition, to ensure the safety and ongoing training of the CNP pilots and to foster Colombianization of the counternarcotics program, INL should upgrade the rotary simulator and purchase a fixed wing simulator that will assist the CNP in the performance of nighttime operations.²⁰

In addition, in order to produce successful efforts to stem the flow of illicit narcotics from the Andean Region, participating parties must be adequately supplied with surveillance assets. The committee is pleased with the progress being made to train more Bell 212 pilots and to equip these aircrafts with Night Vision Goggle (NVG) capabilities as a part of the plan to improve the technical capacity of the CNP. INL held an NVG training session in early January 2006 for 5 Bell 212 pilots. In addition, INL has recently placed an order for 42 upgrade kits for ANVIS-6 NVGs, totaling \$284,000, as well as an order for 52 new ANVIS-9 goggles, totaling \$454,000. These new NVGs and the upgrade kits will be delivered in May 2006.²¹

The committee believes the administration should take a more active role to ensure that the U.S. Government provides financial and technical support for Colombia's demobilization program. Under this program, former members of narco-terrorist organizations (such as the FARC, ELN and AUC) agree to lay down their weapons, stop drug trafficking, provide valuable intelligence to Colombia's security agencies, and seek employment in the civilian economy. Recently, a legal dispute between the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Department of Justice has delayed American support for Colombia's demobilization program and has squandered important opportunities. The administration should actively seek to resolve those differences immediately to prevent any further disruption in U.S. support for this vital program.

Finally, the committee commends the work of INL to stem the international flow of illicit drugs across our American borders and into our neighborhoods. However, the lack of significant coordination between agencies to achieve this goal is a vital concern. The committee is disappointed that the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Department of Defense cannot agree on where to station crucial air assets, and that they cannot reach an agreement on a counter-narcotics mission. The committee is gravely concerned by the lack of coordination among USG agencies to achieve a comprehensive, counter-narcotics strategy and recommends that ONDCP take a prominent leadership role in developing and coordinating a strategy.

Bolivia

ACI funding is given to seven countries located in the Andean Region. While the focus of the initiative has historically and logically been Colombia, Bolivia has lately become a particularly volatile country.

On December 18, 2005, Evo Morales, former leader of the Coca Grower's Union, was elected president by an overwhelming majority. Morales, an indigenous cocalero, ran on a platform of nationalism. He vowed to alleviate poverty and discrimination towards indigenous persons. During his campaign, Morales promised to re-examine the current coca eradication programs.²²

President Morales claims that he wants to increase the production of coca for use in medicines, toothpaste and soft drinks. Eradication efforts are hampered to some extent because the cultivation and sale of small amounts of coca is legal in Bolivia. The United States contends that additional production of the plant—the main ingredient used to make cocaine—eventually ends up on illegal drug markets. To further complicate matters, the coca plant is prized by Bolivian indigenous farmers for traditional medicinal uses and herbal teas.²³

Although he has been in office less than one month, Morales has made numerous cabinet selections believed to be based more on loyalty to his administration rather than qualifications or credentials for the position. Most notable was his selection of Felipe Caceres, a former coca grower, as Bolivia's new drug czar. In an interview with BBC concerning his appointment, Mr. Caceres said he was convinced he would help lead a successful fight within President Morales' government to end drug-trafficking in Bolivia, proclaimed, "What we say is no to drugs, but yes to the coca leaf," adding he would not stop production on his own plantation.²⁴

Prior to taking office, Morales himself was a coca farmer who often protested against U.S.-backed eradication efforts. Since being elected President, Morales has repeatedly said he is seeking a drug-fighting program whose emphasis would be, "No to zero coca, but yes to zero cocaine."²⁵

While it is too soon to predict Morales' stance on counter-narcotics and drug eradication, he has agreed that it, along with U.S. assistance, is important. During campaign speeches, Morales indicated his loyalty to coca farmers by taking the position of "long live coca, death to gringos." However, he has altered his slogan somewhat since his election to "long live coca, death to cocaine."²⁶ Since taking office, no eradication has occurred, although drug interdiction seems to be improving.²⁷

Afghanistan

The administration is requesting \$297.4 million for the State Department's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) programs in Afghanistan.²⁸ According to the ONDCP Budget Summary of the FY 2007 National Drug Control Budget, "Funds will be used to expand the opium poppy elimination program from 12 to 14 provinces, providing coverage for 90 percent of the territory where the poppy crop is grown."²⁹ While this funding will be used to accelerate the development of police programs and to reduce opium poppy cultivation by providing a drug control capacity, the committee is concerned that an insufficient level of cooperation is taking place in Afghanistan among State, DEA, USAID and CENTCOM elements to assure that the issue is properly addressed.

The committee is pleased that the President's FY 2007 budget requests funding up front for State Department counter-narcotics

programs in Afghanistan, rather than seeking to fund it through supplemental requests. Although, there is much more work to be done. The U.S. agencies need to coordinate and depend on many other countries' assistance for military support and assistance, however, counterdrug operations are carried out mostly by Afghan forces. The German mission statement, for example, states, "The responsibility for drug law enforcement is with the Afghan government, it is not part of the mission of the German forces in Afghanistan. It is a central task for the German reconstruction teams to create an atmosphere of security in which Afghan drug law enforcement forces can be trained and in which these forces can be supported realizing their long term drug fighting strategy by the International Community."³⁰

Despite multinational efforts to reduce poppy cultivation and drug trafficking in Afghanistan, in 2005 it continued to supply 87 percent of the world's illicit opium.³¹ In addition, the export of Afghan opium in 2005, which totaled \$2.7 billion, was equivalent to 52 percent of the nation's GDP. Of this sum, 80 percent ends up in the pockets of drug trafficking networks, while the rest is distributed among the nation's two million poppy farmers.³²

While the number of hectares of opium poppy decreased slightly in FY 2005 to 104,000 hectares from 131,000 hectares in FY 2004, the average opium yield increased from 32 kg/ha in FY 2004 to 39 kg/ha in FY 2005, which represented a nearly 22 percent increase in yield.³³ According to the UN report, the Southern Region, including the Helmand province, displayed a 136.3 percent increase in opium poppy production from 27.8 kg/ha in 2004 to 37.9 kg/ha 2005.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai has made a "... clear commitment to stemming drug production and trade in Afghanistan and has set the goal of a 20 percent reduction in opium cultivation in 2006."³⁴ In order to assist Afghanistan in its effort to eliminate its illicit drug economy, strong narcotics laws and law enforcement must be present. The committee is pleased that the President's FY 2007 budget reflects and prioritizes the strategic role of the State Department in assisting the Government of Afghanistan in the development of its legal system and the rule of law. Both the Afghan Counter-narcotics Tribunal (CNT) and the Counter-narcotics Justice Center (CNJC), which have nationwide jurisdiction over prosecution of mid-level and high-level drug trafficking crimes, are now fully operational.³⁵

While this progress is promising, much work still remains to solidify the criminal justice system in Afghanistan and to disarm drug trafficking organizations.³⁶ A recent New York Times article criticized the multinational poppy eradication, alternative development and law enforcement efforts in Afghanistan, noting that farmers have continued growing opium poppy against the directive of the head of the Afghan anti-narcotics department in the Helmand province, and in spite of personal pleas from President Hamid Karzai.³⁷ According to Fazel Ahmad Sherzad, the head of the Afghan anti-narcotics department in the Helmand province, "Last year 40 percent of land was used for poppy cultivation . . . This year it is up to 80 percent in places." According to Mr. Sherzad, many believe that eradication efforts last year were "a joke" as cultivation in Kandahar and Farah increased. Eradication missions even led to conflict between farmers and Afghan eradication teams trained by USAID alternative development contractor, DynCorp.³⁸

In a country that is so vital to the security of the United States and

its allies, opium growth and in turn narcotic production and smuggling, which are widely known to support terrorism, must be eliminated.³⁹ The Taliban is currently conducting a PR campaign to raise drug money to carry out their terrorist activities by circulating flyers demanding farmers to continue growing poppy. According to the new governor in Helmand, the Taliban have forged an alliance with drug smugglers, providing protection for drug convoys and mounting attacks to keep the government away and the poppy flourishing.⁴⁰

The committee strongly encourages the Department of State and other Federal agencies to coordinate their efforts with each other, as well as with their multinational partners and the Afghan government. The committee advises the Department of State to work closely with the Department of Defense in a joint effort to root out the production and trade of illicit narcotics, which finance the Taliban and potentially other terrorist groups.⁴¹ Strong government and law enforcement presence is needed in these poppy growing provinces to enforce existing laws, and to protect those who are carrying out the eradication and alternative development efforts.

It is crucial that every agency responsible for carrying out the international counter-drug strategy remain open and mindful to structural changes that may enhance their efficiency in achieving this strategy. During a committee-initiated briefing with INL held in November 2005, INL staff suggested that counterdrug goals and priorities in Afghanistan may be more effectively achieved if the USAID Alternative Livelihoods alternative development program were to be moved under the supervision of, and funded through, INL. This move would ensure that the USAID Alternative Livelihoods program supports the counter-narcotics strategy of INL. The committee supports this effort.

Methamphetamine

According to the INL FY 2006 Budget Justification, in addition to its traditional mission to stem the flow of cocaine and heroin from Andean countries, "INL is also targeting . . . Mexico, which is . . . a source country for heroin, marijuana as well as methamphetamines. Finally, INL is also giving increased attention the entry of synthetic drugs via the Western Hemisphere into the United States."⁴²

In FY 2007, Mexico will receive \$39 million in INL funding, which will be used for three major programs to combat narcotics trafficking, including efforts to stem the flow of methamphetamine to America. These programs include Homeland/Border Security, Counternarcotics and Institutional Development.⁴³ According to a State Department publication, "attacking methamphetamine production facilities will be a top enforcement priority."⁴⁴ The committee supports this decision and is pleased that a substantial portion of the \$39 million will be used to protect America against the threat of methamphetamine production and trafficking.

According to correspondence received from INL by the committee, INL funds and supports a variety of precursor chemical diversion programs in key nations. Recent multilateral success in regulating the importation of precursors from Canada has shifted the flow of precursors from the Northern Border to the Southern Border. Mexico has become a major source of meth and its precursors, which are frequently smuggled into America across our common border.⁴⁵ In order to address this new challenge, INL is collaborating with the Mexican government to establish training programs, prosecution

teams, and specialized teams to dismantle methamphetamine labs. INL also contributes financial support to the Inter-national Narcotics Control Board's Databank for Precursor Control, which assists governments in their effort to prevent the diversion of precursor chemicals.⁴⁶

The committee commends the efforts of INL to assist law enforcement institutions in other countries in stemming the international flow of illicit narcotics. However, we encourage INL not to neglect the movement of precursor chemicals (those chemicals needed in the production process) in the effort to reduce meth, heroin and cocaine production. Meth use and demand are increasing in the U.S. and elsewhere. Therefore, INL must continue to fund meth precursor interdiction, as well as law enforcement training programs, at appropriate levels.

We must address the meth epidemic using a comprehensive approach of State laws restricting pseudoephedrine and production controls on the few factories that produce pseudoephedrine internationally.⁴⁷ The committee encourages the State Department to work toward a protocol for global tracking of pseudoephedrine shipments.

Finally, the committee expects the State Department to be aggressive in its implementation of the methamphetamine certification statute in the Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005.⁴⁸

¹ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005 Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at <http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/budgetsum04/agency—budget.pdf> (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).

² The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at <http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/dept—state.pdf> (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).

³ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at <http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/06budget.pdf> (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).

⁴ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at <http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/dept—state.pdf> (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).

⁵ Id.

⁶ Id.

⁷ For more information, see the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs home page at <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/> (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).

⁸ Letter from William Todd, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Civilian Police and Asia, Africa and Europe Programs, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State, to Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform (Jan. 9, 2006) (on file with the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).

⁹ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006 Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at <http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/06budget.pdf>. At <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/59169.pdf> (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).

¹⁰ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at <http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/dept—state.pdf> (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).

¹¹ Connie Veillette, *Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and Related Funding Programs: FY2006 Assistance*, CRS Report No. RL 33253 (Congressional Research Service) (Jan. 27, 2006) at <http://www.congress.gov/erp/rl/pdf/RL33253.pdf> (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).

^{1 2} *Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2007: Appendix*, at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/appendix.html> (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).

^{1 3} See CONFERENCE REPORT TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 3057 (FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS ACT OF 2006) H.R. CONF. REP. PUBLIC LAW 109–102, at <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109—cong—bills&docid=f:h3057eh.txt.pdf> (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).

^{1 4} BUREAU FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, (Mar. 2005) at <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2005/vol1/html/42361.htm> (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).

^{1 5} The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006) at 20.

^{1 6} DEPT. OF STATE, SECRETARY OF STATE, SUMMARY AND HIGHLIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, FUNCTION 150, FISCAL YEAR 2007, at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/60297.pdf> (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).

^{1 7} *Id.*

^{1 8} *Id.*

^{1 9} Letter from Henry Hyde, chairman of the International Relations Committee, to Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State (Feb. 14, 2006) (on file with the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).

^{2 0} *Id.*

^{2 1} *Id.*

^{2 2} DEPT. OF STATE, POST REPORTS, (Jan. 25, 2006), at <http://foia.state.gov/phonebook/postrpt/pr—view—all.asp?CntryID=18> (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).

^{2 3} *Coca grower in Bolivia drug post*, BBC NEWS, (Jan. 28, 2006) at <http://www.chron.com/dispatch/story.mpl/bizarre/3619594.html> (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).

^{2 4} *Coca grower in Bolivia drug post*, BBC NEWS, (Jan. 28, 2006) at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4658880.stm> (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).

^{2 5} *Coca grower appointed drug czar in Bolivia*, REUTERS NEWS SERVICE, (Jan. 28, 2006) at <http://www.chron.com/dispatch/story.mpl/bizarre/3619594.html> (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).

^{2 6} State Department Briefing to House Committee on International Relations, (Feb. 10, 2006).

^{2 7} *Id.*

^{2 8} The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at <http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/dept—state.pdf> (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).

^{2 9} *Id.*

^{3 0} Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 15/ 5996 Antrag der Bundesregierung, Fortsetzung der Beteiligung bewaffneter deutscher reitkräfte an dem Einsatz einer Internationalen Sicherheitsunterstützungstruppe in Afghanistan unter Führung der NATO auf Grundlage der Resolutionen 1386 (2001) vom 20. Dezember des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen.

^{3 1} CHRISTOPHER BLANCHARD, AFGHANISTAN: NARCOTICS AND U.S. POLICY, CRS REPORT RL 32686 (Congressional Research Service) (Jan. 25, 2006), at <http://www.congress.gov/erp/rl/pdf/RL32686.pdf> (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).

^{3 2} Press Release, Dept. of State, Office of the Spokesman, *Fact Sheet: Counter-Narcotics* (Jan. 31, 2006) (on file with the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform).

^{3 3} *Summary Findings of Opium Trends in Afghanistan, 2005* (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), (Sept. 12, 2005) at <http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afghanistan—2005/annex—opium-afghanistan—2005—09—09.pdf> (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).

^{3 4} DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, (Mar. 2006) vol. I, at 208.

^{3 5} Press Release, Dept. of State, Office of the Spokesman, *Fact Sheet: Strengthening the Rule of Law* (Jan. 31, 2006) (on file with the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform).

³⁶ See *Afghanistan—Law Enforcement Interdiction Efforts in Transshipment Countries to Stem the Flow of Heroin: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform*, 108th Cong. (Feb. 26, 2004) at [http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/](http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108—house—hearings&docid=f:96524.pdf)

[getdoc.cgi?dbname=108—house—hearings&docid=f:96524.pdf](http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108—house—hearings&docid=f:96524.pdf) (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).

³⁷ Carlotta Gall, *Another Year of Drug War, and the Poppy Crop Flourishes*, THE NEW YORK TIMES, (Feb. 17, 2006) at <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/17/international/asia/17poppy.html?—r=1&oref=slogin> (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).

³⁸ Id.

³⁹ See *U.S. Counternarcotics Policy in Afghanistan: Time for Leadership: Hearing before the House Committee on International Relations*, 109th Cong., (Mar. 17, 2005) at <http://www.house.gov/international—relations/109/20058.pdf> (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).

⁴⁰ Id.

⁴¹ See *Afghanistan: Are the British Counternarcotics Efforts Going Wobbly? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform*, 108th Cong. (Apr. 1, 2004) at <http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS57423> (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).

⁴² DEPT. OF STATE, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, FISCAL YEAR 2006 BUDGET, CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION, at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/54134.pdf> (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).

⁴³ DEPT. OF STATE, SUMMARY AND HIGHLIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, FUNCTION 150, FISCAL YEAR 2007.

⁴⁴ Id.

⁴⁵ Letter from William Todd, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Civilian Police and Asia, Africa and Europe Programs, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State, to Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform (Jan. 9, 2006) (on file with the subcommittee).

⁴⁶ Id.

⁴⁷ *Meth still pouring through loopholes: Congress must adopt global controls to put meth ingredients out of the long reach of the Mexican drug cartels*, THE OREGONIAN, Jan. 24, 2006, at <http://www.oregonlive.com/search/index.ssf?/base/editorial/1138065917166080.xml?oregonian?ede&coll=7#continue> (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).

⁴⁸ The U.S.A. Patriot Act, Title II—The Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005, S. 2118, 108th Cong., at <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109—cong—bills&docid=f:s2118is.txt.pdf> (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).

